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REGISTERING THE POOR TO VOTE:
LESSONS FROM THE 1984 GENERAL
ELECTION
IRA COLBY

Social Work Program
University of Texas at Arlington
Texas

Voter registrationand educationalprograms for the poor and moderate
income groups were a dominant political strategy embraced by a number
of social welfare organizations during the 1984 general election. This
article reviews one such project that registered 4,124 individuals and
implemented a follow-up survey of 500 new registrants. Based on the
survey, the authoridentifies a number of voting and nonvoting behaviors
that should be considered in future voter registration and education
projects. The authoralso identifies criticalpolicy issues that impede voter
participationamong the poor.

INTRODUCTION
Voter registration and education is a political strategy
whose goal is to broaden the electoral support for particular
issues and candidates. Piven and Cloward challenged the social welfare community to adopt voter registration in the 1984
Presidential primaries and general election as a mechanism to
empower the poor in the political process (Piven and Cloward,
1983, 3-14). A number of human service organizations including the National Association of Social Workers, the Council on
Social Work Education, the American Public Health Association, and the American Public Welfare Association, responded
to Piven's and Cloward's call by making voter registration a
high priority during the election year (Livingston, 1-3; Piven
and Cloward, 1985, 583).
This paper, based on the results of a low-income voter

registration project conducted by undergraduate social work
students from the University of Texas-Arlington, examines voting beliefs among new registrants, identifies their voting and
nonvoting trends, and concludes with recommendations to
strengthen the political impact of the poor and near poor.1
METHODOLOGY
BSW students in two community organization classes developed a series of voter registration projects that registered
4,124 individuals. Utilizing 1980 census track data, low-to-moderate income neighborhoods were identified and targeted for
registration. Project registrants were asked to complete a follow-up information sheet of which 3,696 (89.62 percent) were
returned. 2 Of this number, 756 (20.46 percent) were deleted
from further study due to a lack of phone numbers or illegible
handwriting, leaving 2,940 individuals for follow-up purposes.
The students conceptualized voter education as a significant political activity to increase voting rates. An "Adopt-ARegistrant" program was proposed to and implemented by the
Tarrant County League of Women Voters, Fort Worth, Texas,
which met the educational goals of the project. Each League
volunteer was provided names of five or six registrants to contact. Couples, who registered at the same time, were telephoned by two different League members to ensure that each
person was contacted by the project rather than through a
spouse, friend, or significant other. The purposes of the
League's calls were to (a) encourage individuals to vote, (b)
provide names, phone numbers, and/or addresses of local registrar offices for particular problems (i.e., lost voting card), (c)
provide addresses of the polling place, and, finally, (d) share
League information, if requested, concerning candidates and
referenda items. Prior to the phone calls, the new registrants
were randomly placed into one of three groups: Control Group
A and Experimental Groups B and C. Members of Group A
were not telephoned by League members; Group B was contacted once while Group C was telephoned on two separate
occasions. Initial contact with Groups B and C was made two to
three weeks prior to the election with the second call to Group

C placed the evening immediately preceding the Presidential
election.
A random sample without replacement of 500 registrants
was selected and a telephone call survey administered during a
three day period following the November election. 3 The survey, modeled on the instrument utilized by the Texas Secretary
of State's office, was pretested in the 1984 Texas May Primary
with a sample of 156 voters (Peterson). The final data were
coded and analyzed through a Statistical Analysis computer
format.
FINDINGS
Voter Participation
Of those registered, 72.65 percent were female and 27.35
percent were male. The predominance of women was anticipated given that the the majority of the poor and near-poor are
female. The percentage of those who voted was below the
county's (73.92 percent) and national (87.75 percent) figures:
73.50 percent of the new registrants voted in the November
election (U.S. Bureau of the Census). Women voted more frequently then men - 76.08 percent compared to 66.67 percent.
Of those voting, 34.50 percent labeled themselves as "liberal" while 30.23 percent felt they were "conservative" (See
Table 1). Among nonvoters, the percentage of those classifying
themselves as liberal or conservative was lower, while the
"moderate" rating received the highest ranking (54.84
percent).
Women viewed themselves as being more liberal than did
men - 34.51 percent compared to 22.91 percent. Conversely,
males tended to be more conservative than women - 37.50 percent to 24.70 percent (See Table 1).
Registrant Education
The project hypothesized that contact with new registrants
would increase voter turnout and as the number of contacts
increased there would be a rise in voter participation. The independent variable, the number of phone contacts, increased

TABLE 1
POLITICAL IDENTIFICATION BY SEX AND VOTING STATUS
Liberal

Moderate

Conservative

Vote
No Vote
TOTAL

15.62
7.29
22.91

22.92
16.67
39.59

28.12
9.38
37.50

FEMALE

Liberal

Moderate

Conservative

Vote
No Vote
TOTAL

29.02
5.49
34.51

27.06
13.73
40.79

20.00
4.70
24.70

MALE

with each experimental group to determine what changes, if
any, occurred with the dependent variable, voter participation
rates.
Group A, which received no phone contacts, voted 57.02
percent while the voting rates of those groups contacted were
both approximately 1.4 times as large as the noncontact group:
Group B, which was phoned once, reported that 83.61 percent
voted while group C's voting rate, with two phone contacts,
was 81.66 percent (See Table 2).
TABLE 2
NUMBER OF TELEPHONE
CONTACTS AND VOTING RATES
Voted For
President
Contacts

Yes

No

0
1
2

57.02
83.61
81.66

42.98
16.39
18.34

Mobility Among New Registrants
An unexpectedly large percentage of new registrants, 24.20
percent, had changed their residences or were unable to be
contacted at the time of the survey: 7.8 percent had moved,
14.0 percent of the phones were disconnected, and 2.4 percent
were wrong numbers. The May 1984 pretest was unable to
reach 14.70 percent of the registrants for similar reasons. Between May and November, those unable to be contacted increased by 9.50 percent.
A total of 70 phones were disconnected and a random telephone contact of 30 names through the telephone company's
information service was made to determine if the missing registrants remained in the geographic area. However, none of the
individuals were located using the telephone area code as the
contact boundary.
Why Not Vote?
Those voting were asked to identify strategies they felt
would increase the voting percentage while nonvoters were
asked why they didn't vote. Responses were categorized into
two groups - internal (items the individual has control over)
and external (items beyond the control of the individual).
A contrast emerged between the two groups: the nonvoter
identified internal variables for not participating in the election
while voters perceived external issues as the primary barrier to
increased voter participation. Nonvoters identified internal
variables 60.87 percent compared to 39.12 percent for external
reasons (See Table 3). The internal statement I DIDN'T WANT
TO VOTE was the most frequently identified item among nonvoters, 22.83 percent, while the external statement I WAS UNABLE TO FIND THE POLLS was the least frequent response,
2.18 percent.
Those not contacted also identified I DIDN'T WANT TO
VOTE as the primary reason for not voting, though the internal
statement I COULDN'T DECIDE ON THE ISSUES was the
second most frequently rated answer, 19.23 percent.
Nonvoting women in general identified internal reasons
but they rated the external variable I WAS WORKING much

TABLE 3
WHY PEOPLE DON'T VOTE BY SEX
Reason
Internal
Didn't want to
Was too busy
Forgot
Issues not important
External
Was working
Medical reasons
Out of town
Couldn't find the polls
Couldn't get a ride

Male

Female

14.13
4.35
3.26
0.00

8.70
9.78
6.52
14.13

5.43
2.17
3.26
1.09
1.09

13.04
7.61
2.17
1.09
2.17

higher than nonvoting males - 13.04 percent to 5.43 percent.
Nonvoting males, on the other hand, claimed their decision
was by personal choice. Approximately 14 percent of the nonvoting males "Didn't want to vote," which is more than three
times the rate of any other variable for this cohort.
Voters rated the external statement PROVIDE TRANSPORTATION TO THE POLLS highest at 27.91 percent. Transportation, however, was the least important issue to the nonvoter - only 2.18 percent reported this as a problem area (See
Table 4).
IMPLICATIONS FOR REGISTRATION/EDUCATION
PROJECTS
The social welfare community embraced voter registration/education as a vehicle to involve society's historically politically disenfranchised members in reshaping the nation's
social agenda. It is impossible to determine the exact number of
persons who were registered and voted as a result of these
national efforts. 4 Further, it is equally as difficult to substantiate the impact made by these new voters in the 1984 general

TABLE 4
WHAT WILL GENERATE HIGHER VOTER RATES BY SEX AND
THOSE WHO VOTED
Reason

Male

Female

Internal
Need better issues
Find better candidates
Have fewer elections
Have the candidate meet the voter more often

1.94
1.16
3.10
.78

7.75
5.81
4.26
4.26

External
More Advertising
Better publicity of the polling locations
Provide Transportation
Make voting mandatory

2.71
1.16
5.43
1.16

13.71
5.81
22.48
1.16

No idea
Other ideas

1.94
1.94

7.75
2.71

election. If the sole criterion for success was the repudiation of
the Reagan administration then the registration projects were a
failure; however, if these projects were to broaden the political
sphere among the poor and near-poor, then the projects were a
partial success.
What are the lessons of the 1984 registration/education
projects? There are a number of key points this study supports
for future efforts: (1) the poor tend to be more liberal than the
general population with women less conservative than men; (2)
contact increases voter turnout; (3) transportation to the polls is
not a significant dilemma for the nonvoter; and (4) some individuals will, as a personal conviction, chose not to vote.
The study also raises important questions which require
further research and collective action. First, mobility by the
poor and near-poor indicates that registration strategies must
contend with voter movement as a barrier that keeps people
from voting. In the 1984 Presidential election only five states,
Maine, Minnesota, North Dakota, Oregon, and Wisconsin, al-

lowed election day registration. Conversely, citizens in 35
states and territories were faced with a registration deadline of
at least 28 days prior to the election. 5 Such laws clearly limit
electoral participation by the poor, a highly mobile population
group, and penalize their political status due to their economic
circumstances.
This high mobility also mandates that low-to-moderate income neighborhoods must be recanvassed to register new residents - an area once covered will need to be reworked within a
short period of time.
An equally important issue revolves around working women's access to the polls. This research found that indiscriminate
use of employer compensation policy created an obstacle to the
polls. In effect, low-income women were placed in a doublebind situation: on the one hand, the women's liberal identification implies support for realigning the nation's conservative
social goals, but if they did vote, they feared not being paid at
work. The choice of not voting is understandable and clear in
the face of a low income and the threat of lost wages. Effective
public policy must be developed to protect the workers' incomes when exercising their political rights.
This study verified that voter contact increases the likelihood that an individual will vote. However, this research
does not show a significant difference between voting rates and
the number of contacts, a finding contrary to traditional political thinking. This lack of difference is attributable to a number
of external variables (such as the preponderance of political
advertising, issue/candidate mailings, telephoning conducted
by various interest groups) not controlled for in this study. This
is a critical area for political groups: if it is determined, for
instance, that one contact is sufficient then needless redundancy may be eliminated and volunteer energies can be utilized
more effectively.
Finally, evaluative research is required to determine the
effectiveness of a number of voter education strategies. This
project utilized a telephone strategy, but alternative models
exist: do literature mailings accelerate voter rates; would personal contact by candidates or their supporters increase voter

participation; what is the impact of combining literature mailings, telephoning, and personal visits in an election?
The lessons of 1984 provide an excellent opportunity to
plan for future elections. The social welfare community must
rethink its strategies for voter registration and education projects - the goals set forth by Piven and Cloward may be
achieved if there are significant modifications in strategies and
related public policies.
NOTES
1. The American Political Science Foundation provides a brief analysis of
voting patterns for each of the national elections from 1972 thru 1980.
For example, see C. Anthony Broh and Charles L. Prysby, Voting Behavior: The 1980 Election, (1981); also, Democratic National Committee, Voter
Registration Manual, Washington, DC: Democratic National Committee.
2. It is a violation of Texas law to take any information directly from a voter
application, thus the need for a separate sign-up sheet.
3. A limitation to the telephone survey is that information is often impossible
to verify and cannot be taken at face value. As a result, analysis, interpretation, and generalizability of data should integrate these design
limitations. See, D.W. Fiske, "When Are Verbal Reports Veridical?" in
R.A. Shweder (ed.), "Fallible Judgement in Behavioral Research," New
Directions for Methodology of Social and Behavioral Science, San Francisco:
Jossey-Bass, 1980; Claire Selltiz, Lawrence S. Wrightsman, and Stuart
W. Cook, Research Methods in Social Relations, New York: Holt, Rinehart,
and Winston, 3rd edition, 1976, pp. 292-293.
4. Human SERVE, a national organization based on the principles of Piven
and Cloward, reportedly registered 275,000 people by October, 1984.
5. States and territories requiring 28 or more days as a registration deadline
include Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nevada, New Jersey,
New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wyoming, Guam, Puerto Rico, and
the Virgin Islands.
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